Postmodernism is old, let us go further : a  pamphlet against decostructionism, constructivism, relativism, and methodological anarchism by Campa, Riccardo et al.
R ICCARDO CAMPA (Italy)
L u c a s  M a z u r  (u sa ) 
M ic h a ł  O sso w sk i (Poland) 
J o a n n a  R e in e l t  (Poland) 
MlRABELLE LE BOULICAUT (France) 
A n n a  J u r c z a k  (Poland) 
M o n ik a  H o ł ó w k a  (Poland)
Postmodernism is Old, Let Us Go Further: 
a pamphlet against deconstructionism, constructivism 
relatiyism and methodological anarchism
This paper means to be a collective and intercultural pamphlet against the 
postmodem approach to knowledge. However, our criticism — mainly directed 
at deconstructionism, constructivism, relativism and methodological anarchism 
— is not grounded in old positivistic philosophy. We are young scholars and 
students whose teachers were mainly postmodernists, therefore we accept some 
of their ideas, but we also feel it necessary to stress the many limits of this 
approach and its inadeąuacy to respond to the challenges of the present day. 
From our perspective, postmodernism is not a new approach that must be 
simply studied, but an old one that needs to be surpassed. One of the merits of 
postmodernism is that it showed that positivism was too dogmatic and 
optimistic with regards to the progress of knowledge and civilization. However, 
in responding to positivism, postmodernism has gone too far in producing 
skepticism and pessimism. In addition, postmodernism is paradoxical when 
rejecting the categories of truth and progress, while still considering itself to be 
an approach better than positivism. Up to now the argument used to defend its 
preferability was its novelty. But an idea that is forty years old and was already 
anticipated at the beginning of the twentieth century1 cannot be treated as new.
1 Thomas Kuhn — the first to challenge traditional epistemology — published his masterpiece 
The structure of scientific revolutions in 1962 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago); Jacąues 
Derrida — the father of deconstructionism — published his three major works in 1967 and the 
translations in English appeared a few years later (Speech and Phenomena, Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston, TL, 1973; Of Grammatology, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1976;
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For all of these reasons this paper should be seen as one of the first examples of 
post-postmodern thought.
Positmsm against postmodernism: tertium non datur? Postmodernism is a poly- 
morphic cultural movement that contains in itself many different approaches. 
The form that postmodernism takes inside the philosophy of science is 
methodological anarchism, an explicitly antiscience doctrine formulated and 
defended by Paul Feyerabend. In generał philosophy, it is worth mentioning the 
work of Jean-Franęois Lyotard, Richard Rorty, and Gianni Vattimo. In 
literary criticism, postmodernism takes mainly the form of Derrida’s deconst­
ructionism. We also find postmodern approaches to art, economics, geography, 
psychology, and many other disciplines, but it is in the sociology of science that 
postmodernism has become totally dominant, in the form of constructivism or 
relativism. It is currently dominant to such a degree that today it is hard to find 
a non-postmodern sociologist of science. Here is a list of some of the 
postmodern practitioners of this discipline: Harry Collins, David Travis, Trevor 
Pinch, David Bloor, Barry Barnes, Steven Shapin, Donald MacKenzie, Bill 
Harvey, Andy Pickering, Roger Krohn, Richard Whitley, Karin Knorr-Cetina, 
Mulkay, Nigel Gilbert, Steve Woolgar, and Bruno Latour2.
T o say what all of these approaches have in common is not easy task, but it 
is worth trying. According to us, most of the scholars who ąualify as 
postmodemists in literaturę, philosophy, and the social Sciences share the 
following features:
— Claim to novelty. They present their ideas as revolutionary or radically 
new, and they assume that new and fashionable ideas are preferable to old and 
unfashionable ones.
— Tendency toward pessimism. They ąualify as modern or positivistic the 
approaches that precede them and consider them to be mistakes of the past.
Writing and Difference, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1978); Paul Feyerabend — the father 
of methodological anarchism — published Against methodin 1975 (Humanities Press) and Science 
in a Free Society in 1978 (New Left Books, London 1978); Les mots et les choses: une archeologie des 
Sciences humaines by Michel Foucault appeared in 1966 (Gallimard, Paris); Anti-Oedipe by Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Editions de Minuit, Paris) was published in 1972; the manifesto of 
constructivism, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact by Ludwik Fleck was first published in 
German in 1935 and then translated into English in 1979 (Chicago University Press); the paper 
“Scientific Ethos: a Deviant Viewpoint” by Barnes and Dolby — one of the first contributions to 
postmodern sociology of science — appears in 1970 in the “European Journal of Sociology”, 
vol. 11. The name for the movement was invented by Jean-Franęois Lyotard in 1979 (see La 
Condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir, Editions de Minuit, Paris), but Lyotard himself 
specified that postmodemity began at the end of the Second World War.
2 We do not find ourselves in a position to furnish a detailed bibliography of all the ąuoted 
scholars. We are confident that the reader will be able to find by himherself further information 
about these authors and their writings.
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This is mainly because, in their eyes, positivism showed too much faith in 
human reason, science, and technology. This optimism is seen as a mistake 
because it was then betrayed by history (in the form of World Wars, 
totalitarianism, the Holocaust, nuclear threat, pollution, poverty in the third 
world, etc.).
— Ambiguous skepticism. They refuse the category of truth and they make 
all possible effort not to use this concept-and-term in their writings. They 
nonetheless criticize other works and believe their own to be preferable to those 
produced by their critics. They also deny the category of cognitive progress, and 
likewise take pains not to use it in their writings. However, they seem to believe 
that the paradigm-shift from positmsm to postmodernism was a good thing.
— Anti-scientific attitude. They believe that human reason, and especially 
western-type rationality (which finds expression mainly in science and techno­
logy), is harmful to humankind and that it is one of the major causes of 
problems in modern societies. Indeed, they generally accuse positmsm of 
having privileged mathematics, engineering and the natural Sciences, while 
having undervalued art, humanities and the social Sciences. In response they do 
the opposite.
In brief, postmodernism eąuals supposed novelty, skepticism, pessimism, 
and antiscience (plus a certain degree of logical incoherence). We are perfectly 
aware that characterizing in such a synthetic way a movement formed by 
hundreds of thinkers with their own specific ideas and personalities could be 
interpreted as an oversimplification, but it was hard to avoid this inconvenience 
in the space of such a short paper. However, even in longer writings, 
postmodemists did not take the trouble to distinguish between rationalists, 
positivists, logical positivists, neorationalists, analitic philosophers, critical 
rationalists and other types of modem thinkers, simply labeling them positivists. 
As post-postmodernists, we feel legitimated in doing the same. But why do we 
stress the fact that our criticism comes from a post-postmodern perspective? 
That is because we do not simply prefer tradition to novelty, dogmatism to 
skepticism, optimism to pessimism, natural Sciences to humanities, as positivists 
would do. Our position is indeed an attempt at finding a third road, one 
alternative to those tread by positmsm and postmodernism. Let us now present 
in detail our criticism of the above-mentioned aspects of the postmodern 
approach.
Claim to novelty. Why does the problem of novelty become of vital importance 
when speaking of postmodernism? Postmodemists affirm that ideas are neither 
true nor false, in a universal sense, but only “trendy” or “non-trendy”. To be 
sure, postmodemists are ambiguous concerning relativism: at times they appear
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to accept it in order to stress their novelty in contrast to the modern perspective, 
but sińce relativism is self-refuting from a logical point of view and produces 
nihilism from a morał point of view, postmodemists distance themselves from 
it — when it is convenient — by using the now classic argument “but I never 
said that...”3 If they never said that, that is, if they reject relativism, where then 
is the novelty of this approach? Relativism is a double-edged sword: on the 
one hand, it is necessary in order to show originality, but on the other hand, 
the morał and cognitive criticism of consistent relativists is reduced to a matter 
of taste. Such criticism is meaningful only if one refers to universal values. If 
postmodernism does not fully embrace cognitive and morał relativism, then it 
does not exist — not, at least, as a new perspective. The postmodemists would 
stiłl fali in the wake of the modern tradition, and due to their ambiguity and 
lack of clarity, they would be deemed of less value than modern thinkers. We 
do not evaluate postmodern thinkers more negatively than modern ones, as we 
interpret them to be radical relativists (and no consistent postmodern should 
complain about this interpretation because, after all, as Derrida said, all 
interpretations are eąually good or bad and the intention of the author is not 
that important...). But if all ideas are eąually right or wrong, correct or 
incorrect, and this applies also to relativism, why then should someone choose 
relativism? One of the typical answers to this ąuestion is that postmodernism 
is preferable to positivism, because it is consistent with the last change of 
paradigm, that is, because it is new and fashionable. As post-postmodernists, 
we are ready to accept this argument, but we must also stress that now 
postmodernism is anything but new. It was new. How can a doctrine forty 
years old be new or trendy? Postmodernism has its roots in the Counterculture 
and in the “Flower Power” age. We have already entered the post-postmodern 
era. Thus the ideas of the postmodemists, though interesting, are no longer 
adeąuately fit the current social situation.
3 Consider the following situation. Critical rationalists a la Popper assumed that a) the world 
exists; b) but we do not have an easy and direct access to the truth; and, conseąuently, c) we try to 
understand it by selecting the best theory among a number of competing ones, by means of open 
and critical discussion. After having rejected rationalism in the name of relativism, and having 
understood that relativism is self-refuting, some constructivists came to this surprising conclusion: 
“Epistemic relativism is not committed to the idea that there is no materiał world, or that all 
knowledge claims are eąually good or bad, or to the idea that meter readings can be made to our 
liking. It is only committed to the idea that what we make of physical resistance and of meter signals 
is itself grounded in human assumptions and selections which appear to be specific to a particular 
historical place and time. This neither precludes development over time, nor does it reąuire one to 
subscribe to conceptions of incommensurable world views...” (K. D. Knorr-Cetina, The Constructivist 
Programme in the Sociology of Science: Retreats or Advances?, Social Studies of Science, vol. 12, 
1982, p. 321). Should we understand that epistemic relativism is just another name for critical 
rationalism?
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Someone may object: but who decided that we entered the post-postmodern 
era? We may answer by saying that a passive acceptance of relativism made 
sense in the Cold War era, when humankind was separated into at least three 
independent worlds, but it does not make sense in a globalized and interdepen- 
dent world, where the problem of one is the problem of all. Lyotard often 
referred to nation-states and governments, but today, pollution, terrorism and 
information know no borders. In the post-postmodern condition one can feel 
the growing need for common values — that is, human values — to face new 
social problems.
We could also mention the fact that the new generations are not as paranoid 
about computerization as was Lyotard, In 1979 it was hard to predict that the 
Internet would come to strengthen indmduals, and not only multi-national 
corporations, as producers and consumers of ideas. This has, however, taken 
place, and information technology is now seen, especially by young people, as 
a factor of liberation, and not of oppression as in Orwell’s 1984 scenario. It is 
not by chance that in Italian slang, all words connected with hi-tech now have 
very positive connotations. A “cyborg” is a “cool person” , and “replicant” 
means “superior to human miseries” . If you want to praise someone or 
something you say plastiko, kosmiko, iper-tekniko, cyber, cibernetiko, robotiz- 
zato, mekkanizzato. If you want to offend someone you say “flower power” 
which means “definitively out of fashion” ; and dulcis in fundo “post-post” 
denotes something hard to define but surely very very trendy4.
But we have a better argument than these, that is, a postmodern one. Who 
decided that in 1945 modernity has finished and postmodemity had begun? 
Postmodemists — and without asking the permission to the modernists. To put 
into practice what we learned from our teachers, we freely assert that 
post-postmodernity starts from the day of the publication of this article.
Tendency toward pessimism. Postmodern philosophy has produced a ąuite 
pessimistic view of reality: humans — prisoners of the conceptual apparatus 
implanted in their minds by such superhuman entities as their Community, 
Society, or Historical Age — are hopelessly condemned to live in a world that 
they will never understand. Every human is supposed to be incapable of 
understanding him/herself, incapable of understanding his/her own society, 
incapable of communicating and dealing with humans belonging to other 
societies or having different worldviews, incapable of understanding the natural 
world, incapable of using technical knowledge for ethically acceptable purposes, 
and incapable of grasping the truth and meaning of existence. “Impossibility”
4 See G. R. Manzoni, Peso Vero Ściero: Dizionario del linguaggio giovanile difine millennio, Est, 
Milano 1997.
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can be seen as one of the key words of postmodernism. The forms of knowledge 
that have given some hope to humanity — philosophy, religion, science, and 
technology — are under the threat of this current of thought and risk being 
reduced to ruins. Are we exaggerating? This is not simply the image of 
postmodernism that a few scholars and students have acąuired inside the world 
of universities. Pope John Paul II has decided to write an encyclical denouncing 
the dangers of postmodernism5, indicating that postmodern philosophy has also 
gained this same reputation outside academia. We may be believers or 
non-believers, this is not the matter here. With this quotation, we simply aim to 
show that defending or criticizing postmodernism is not just an innocent 
intellectual game inside academia. As is well known, the Church has learned 
through mistakes (e.g., the Galileo affair) to be very cautious when interfering 
with philosophical and scientific research. Thus, if the Church now moves, it 
does not do so rashly.
However, we leave to religious people the task of defending faith, and we 
focus our attention on the two most explicitly outraged forms of knowledge: 
science and technology. First of all, science and technology are understood all 
too often to be as one, and when rarely the difference is recognized, science is 
seen as the servant of technology. It is true, especially in the 20^ century, that 
humans have clearly understood the connection between abstract knowledge 
and action, and so created a virtuous circle between science and technology. But 
the two activities remain in principle different. The theory of relativity was not 
formulated with the intention of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, 
the theory was proved by means of small-scale experiments long before its 
military applications were discovered. This is to say that science is not and does 
not have to be necessarily produced in view of applications.
Lyotard6 points out that science, and the logie it necessarily entails, speaks 
a “denotative” language. In other words, it aims to describe objective reality, 
but, contrarily to narrative forms of knowledge (e.g., myths), does not serve as
5 John Paul II writes (Fides et rado, section 91): “[T]he currents of thought which claim to be 
postmodern merit appropriate attention. According to some of them, the time of certainties is 
irrevocably past, and the human being must now learn to live in a horizon of total absence of 
meaning, where everything is provisional and ephemeral. [...] This nihilism has been justified in 
a sense by the terrible experience of evil which has marked our age. Such a dramatic experience has 
ensured the collapse of rationalist optimism, which viewed history as the triumphant progress of 
reason, the source of all happiness and freedom; and now, at the end of this century, one of our 
greatest threats is the temptation to despair”. And he adds (section 56): “In brief, there are signs of 
a widespread distrust of universal and absolute statements, especially among those who think that 
truth is bom of consensus and not a consonance between intellect and objective reality. [...] I cannot 
but encourage philosophers — be they Christian or not — to trust in the power of human reason 
and not to set themselves goals that are too modest in their philosophizing”.
6 See F. Lyotard, La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir, Editions de Minuit, Paris 
1979, passim.
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a normative guide to humans. As such, it is outside the realm of other very real 
and very true elements of human existence, such as love, hate, ąuestions of 
morality, m an’s search for meaning, etc. Lyotard is partly right, but he is talking 
about that caricature of science produced by positivists — that is, a merely 
technologically oriented science. Comte, the father of Positivism, considered 
disinterested research a crime and invited scientists not to study macroscopic or 
microscopic objects (stars, atoms, etc.) because he considered them useless to 
the technological needs of humanity7. Pure science, however, being still strictly 
connected and intertwined with philosophy, always tries and has tried to answer 
the ultimate ąuestions of man: who we are? where are we from? where are we 
going? what is life? what is matter? when and how did the universe come into 
existence? will it exist forever? etc. These are the same ąuestions asked and 
answered by myths, religions, and philosophies. Pure science is marching in the 
same direction as these other forms of knowledge, albeit with different methods. 
Only those who do not trust their own beliefs can fear science, for all discoveries 
about the genetic code, the atomie structure of matter, the beginning of the 
universe, the origin of humans via evolution, the functioning of neurons, etc., 
are bringing us closer and closer to revealing the mystery of our existence. These 
answers are compatible with some religious and mythical explanations and 
incompatible with others, and thus may help to get rid of, or reinterpret, the 
incompatible ones. Those who really care about these fundamental ąuestions 
can be anything but pessimistic when watching the cognitive progress of pure 
science in recent years8.
How can we say that science is cold or merely denotative when it aims to 
answer the ultimate ąuestions of humans? Postmodemists, when speaking 
about science, are clearly talking about applied science or engineering. In this 
perspective, what they say is true: technical knowledge is mute about the uses
7 See A. Comte, Cours dephilosophie positive, vol. VI, Paris 1892, p. 751, and idem, Systeme de 
politiąuepositive ou traite de sociologie instituant la religion de 1’humanite, vol. IV, Paris 1900, p. 212.
8 This is not true only for rationalists, but also for religious people who understood how 
distorted the image of science produced by positivists and postmodemists really was. John Paul II 
writes: “Finally, I cannot fail to address a word to scientists, whose research offers an ever greater 
knowledge of the universe as a whole and of the incredibly rich array of its component parts, 
animate and inanimate, with their complex atomie and molecular structures. So far has science 
come, especially in this century, that its achievements never cease to amaze us. In expressing my 
admiration and in offering encouragement to these brave pioneers of scientific research, to whom 
humanity owes so much of its current development, I would urge them to continue their efforts 
without ever abandoning the sapiential horizon within which scientific and technological 
achievements are wedded to the philosophical and ethical values which are distinctive and indelible 
mark of the human person. Scientists are well aware that the search for truth, even when it concerns 
a finite reality of the world or of man, is never-ending, but always points beyond to something 
higher than the immediate object of study, to the ąuestions which give access to Mystery” (Fides et 
ratio, section 106).
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that can be made of it. Technology is constitutively a-moral, therefore not 
necessarily morał or immoral. When talking about technology, we reject both 
the optimism of positivists and the pessimism of postmodemists, precisely for 
this reason. As an alternative, we try to focus on the possibilities that we have to 
use technology in positive ways, and here we have the problem of ethics.
Technological advancements have given us the tools to both help and hurt 
our fellow man on a scalę yet unprecedented in human history, and this does, or 
at least should, give mankind pause when tinkering with the natural world. 
While such technology may be new, the propensity to act in such ways is 
fortunately and unfortunately not. If it were in fact something new, we could 
halt the whole process at the objections of postmodernism, and rest assured that 
kindness would prevail among men. The active rejection of “scientific” 
knowledge via paralogy would be the cure for the ills of society. This does not, 
however, reflect reality. Technology is too important to humanity to be left 
going where it wants or to be reduced to a target of blame and contempt. 
Technology must be governed. In order to come to consensus on a planetary 
level about the ways in which we are to govern technology, we must first believe 
there to be good and bad narratives and, secondly, via intercultural discussion, 
actively seek out the good ones.
In short, between a doctrine that seems to believe that the developments 
of knowledge and society are necessary and necessarily good and that 
science and technology are capable of solving all the problems of humanity 
(positivism) and a pessimistic doctrine that simply States the impossibility 
of progress in knowledge and ethics (postmodernism), we defend the idea 
of the possibility (that is, neither the necessity nor impossibility) of positive 
developments in both fields.
Ambiguous skepticism. We consider the problem of skepticism and metho­
dological relativism to be one of the major weaknesses of postmodern thought. 
As mentioned before, writers who think of themselves as postmodemists refuse 
the categories of truth and cognitive progress. We can summarize their attitude 
towards research in the following single sentence: “the natural world has a smali 
or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge”9. At times, in 
order to support their opinions they attempt to discredit the work of scientific 
teams. A good example of this is the book Laboratory Life by Latour and 
Woolgar10. Despite their relativism, they are still ready to claim the ability to
9 H. M. Collins, Knowledge, Norms and Rules in the Sociology of Science, Social Studies of 
Science, vol. 1, 1982.
10 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts, Sage, 
Beverly Hills 1979. The two anthropologists studied empirically the work of a scientific team 
(working at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies, California, and obtaining the Nobel Prize) and
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criticize other works on the basis of some better (do they mean “morę true”?) 
postmodern paradigm. Moreover, after stating that facts are socially constructed, 
and not simply theory-laden, some of them still insist on the empirical naturę of 
their own findings and on the value of empirical studies in generał. K norr", for 
example, seems to believe that direct observation of the object (science) will 
reveal its actual naturę. This contradiction vanishes under one condition: one 
must assume that social scientists, unlike natural scientists, can directly observe 
their object of study and understand its real naturę. If postmodern sociologists 
of knowledge have developed a special method that permits them to observe 
and understand reality, why do not they teach it to natural scientists? Do they 
keep secret their miraculous method because they enjoy observing natural 
scientists naively busy with imenting/constructing entities such as planets, stars, 
earthąuakes, atoms, genes, neurons, and electrons?
Consistent relativists admit that they do not have such a miraculous 
method. In order to avoid the contradiction of claiming the universality of the 
negation of universality, they conclude that relativism is true only for relativists. 
Relativism is not supported by evidence, but is just one more ideology on a par 
with positivism. Relativism is a matter of faith. But even when they accept this 
painful conclusion, relativists are still able to contradict themseWes. By trying to 
be logically coherent, they submit themselves to the universal laws of logie. 
Conclusion: we cannot escape universalism.
Postmodemists also say that their approach, being radically empiricist, 
avoids metaphysics. The constructivist Zybertowicz12 writes that he is “against 
explanations of knowledge which refer to standards and categories that 
transcend the empirical reality” and that his “interest is not whether the ideas 
produced by science are true in any metaphysical sense, but in finding social
concluded that what they produced was merely the outeome of a social negotiation among 
scientists. In spite of the fact that they did not know much about biology, they concluded that facts 
were socially constructed and not discovered. We could however conclude that Latour and 
Woolgar’s research cannot be taken seriously because, symmetrically, it was merely the outeome of 
social negotiation between anthropologists.
11 “Indeed the internalist and microscopic naturę of the constructivist endeavour would seem 
to be best served by methodological procedures which take advantage of the opportunity for direct 
observation [italics supplied, hereafter] which only the study of contemporary science provides... 
My argument is that the process of production of new scientific objects, as well as the process of 
acceptance (through contestation and incorporation), should preferably be scrutinized through 
direct observation of the site of scientific work. The loci of construction of scientific objects are the 
sites of action in which these objects are generated and transformed. To observe what happens in any 
one of these sites at some length would appear to be the best we can do to begin our project... The 
effort directed at a better understanding of how science actually works has just begun” (K. D. 
Knorr-Cetina, The Constructmst Programme, p. 323). We just think that these statements comment 
themselves.
12 The Success of the Natural Sciences Sociologically Explained, Studia Metodologiczne, t. 29, 
1999, p. 14.
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causes of variation in their social reputation” . However, it is enough to admit 
that there is an external world to produce metaphysics, because the existence of 
something outside our mind is not demonstrable with empirical methods. Only 
solipsism permits the avoidance of metaphysics, but most constructivists seem 
to believe that the scientists they are studying actually exist13. Conclusion: as we 
cannot escape universalism, we cannot escape metaphysics.
If so, why not accept a more reasonable image of knowledge? There are 
scientific theories that explain ąuite satisfactorily many natural, and even social, 
phenomena. There are devices built on the basis of scientific theories that work 
effectively in everyday life. There are also many cases of accidental discoveries in 
both the social and natural Sciences. Why not accept the simple truth that not 
every fact that we observe is necessarily contained in the theories we already know 
and that not all knowledge is related to the social structure that regulates the 
behavior of scientists? Once we are aware of the unavoidability of metaphysics, 
why not use the terms “truth” and “progress” , instead of the many ridiculous 
locutions used by postmodemists to symbolize the same concepts?
In short, in between a doctrine that seems to assume that everything can be 
known through the application of true scientific method, but then focuses only 
on the surface of phenomena (positivism) and a doctrine that seems to affirm 
that nothing can be known because all knowledge is relative and determined by 
the social structure (postmodernism), we believe that something can be known by 
means of observations, metaphysical reflections, logical calculus, intuition, 
deduction, induction, criticism, or rational discussion. Therefore, we encourage 
dialogue in all its forms and any attempt to search for truth, justice and beauty.
Anti-scientific attitude. Postmodernism is often associated with “antiscience” . 
Sometimes the two are even eąuated14. These interpretations are not groundless, 
as seen in the following ąuotation:
13 This is not always elear however. Indeed A. Zybertowicz States: “[sjcientific cognition could 
not evolve as a legitimate form of activity unless it has become socially recognized that there is 
something out there to be searched for and eventually represented in language. Therefore I claim 
that not only the institution of science but also its subject-matter is a product of history” (idem, 
Theory of Culture, Stages of Social Cognitive Change and the Paranormal Phenomena, Studia 
Metodologiczne, t. 29, 1999, p. 43). What should we understand from this sentence? Are 
postmodemists ready to accept solipsism? If yes, how can they then form a movement?
14 This is, for example, the diagnosis of Mario Bunge, one of the preeminent philosophers of 
science of our day: “The academic enemies of the very raison d’ętre of the university can be grouped 
into two bands: the antiscientists, who often cali themselves ‘postmodemists’, and the pseudoscien- 
tists. The former teach that there are no objective and universal truths, whereas the academic 
pseudoscientists smuggle fuzzy concepts, wilds conjectures, or even ideology as scientific findings. 
Both gangs operate under the protection of academic freedom, and often at the taxpayers expense, 
too” (idem, In Praise of Intolerance to Charlatanism in Academia, Annals New York Academy of 
Science, June 24, 1996).
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Science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit. It is 
one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and not 
necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy, and impudent, but it is inherently 
superior only for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or 
who have accepted it without ever having examined its advantages and its limits. 
And as the accepting and rejecting of ideologies should be left to the individual it 
follows that the separation of State and church must be complemented by the 
separation of State and science, that most recent, most aggressive, and most 
dogmatic religious institution. Such a separation may be our only chance to achieve 
a humanity we are capable of, but have never fully realized15.
We do not know to what extent postmodernism is anti-scientific, but as 
postmodemists themselves affirm, it is only the reputation of ideas that really 
matters. To be sure, they have not done much in the way of clearing their name 
of such conclusions. Someone may object that Feyerabend and his followers are 
not antiscience, but simply a-science. Indeed they do not State that science is 
worse than other types of knowledge, but only that it is not better. This is, 
however, a mere sophism. Consider a football match in which team A is much 
stronger than team B. Team A is close to winning, but the corrupted referee 
leads to a draw. Can we say that the referee is not anti-team A, merely because 
he did not make them lose?
It is true that science and myths have something in common: the questions. 
Nonetheless, it does not seem very reasonable to deny that science has gone 
much farther in answering some of these ąuestions, especially those falling 
under the rubric of cosmology and ontology. Feyerabend, being a histrionic 
personage, was just exaggerating for the sake of discussion. There is evidence of 
this in his private correspondence with Lakatos. Unfortunately, an entire 
generation of students with no sense of humor took him seriously and has 
become much more dogmatic and aggressive than that science criticized by 
Feyerabend. If Feyerabend were still alive and could see how postmodemists 
behave, he would probably become a post-postmodernist!
Even assuming that science is a myth or narrative on par with others, to ask 
for the separation between State and science implies a reference to a superior 
value: democracy. If all narratives are eąually good or bad, how can 
postmodemists assume the positivist myth of heroic science to be worse than 
a narrative like “fuli democracy”? To be consistent, they should accept the myth 
of science and respect it. But we know well that they do not. They react ąuite 
vehemently each time someone tries to defend what they cali the ideology of 
science and reason. The real motto of postmodernism is not “anything goes” , 
but “anything goes, if you agree with us” .
Feyerabend showed some admiration for the scientist-philosopher of the 
past, who was professionally disinterested and dealt with the ultimate ąuestions
15 P. Feyerabend, Against Method, Yerso, London 1975, p. 295.
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of man, while he has contempt for what he has called “the human ants” 
presently working in scientific laboratories16. If this is the problem, why not 
defend disinterested and philosophically oriented science? Also Lyotard 
complains, due to the mercantilization of knowledge students no longer ask if 
something is true, but rather of what use it is to them. At least two ąuestions 
then arise: how can one be surprised that his/her students do not look for truth, 
if they are taught that there is no objective truth? And why does Lyotard, like 
Feyerabend, not lift a finger to promote disinterested knowledge? Indeed 
postmodemists were able to criticize the mercantilization of knowledge and, at 
the same time, to reject disinterested science as a pure ideology17. This is not, 
however, schizophrenia. The naked truth is that postmodemists could gain 
popularity by criticizing science, whether applied or pure, commercial or 
disinterested. At that time, attacking science and defending art, myths, and the 
humanities was original and also remunerative in economic terms18. In a world 
in which hundreds articles and book are published everyday, originality is much 
more important than truth.
Nonetheless, the times have changed. Now, to be antiscience is outdated, as 
was being a positivist in the 1970s. The internet and new graphic technologies 
have increased the number publications to such an extent that even the 
eccentricity of an author does not help him/her to be noticed in the noise. Thus, 
in post-postmodern times there is no longer a reason to abandon reasonability. 
Paradoxically, this first contribution to post-postmodern thought is original 
precisely because it is reasonable.
In brief, in between a doctrine that glorifi.es mathematics, engineering and 
the natural Sciences as the only type of genuine knowledge or as an example for 
all other Sciences (positivism), and a doctrine that discredits these disciplines 
and sets them against art, the humanities and the social Sciences in order to gain 
visibility (postmodernism), we defend the ideał of harmony in the fields of 
culture and knowledge and we consider good intellectuals those who enjoy 
reading and discussing poetry, literaturę, religion, history, the social Sciences, 
musie, mathematics, engineering, the natural Sciences, and all historically
16 “As opposed to its immediate predecessor, late 20th-century science has given up all 
philosophical pretensions and has become a powerful business that shapes the mentality of its 
practitioners. Good payment, good standing with the boss and the colleagues in their ‘unit’ are the 
chief aims of these human ants who excel in the solution of tiny problems but who cannot make 
sense of anything transcending their domain of competence” (P. Feyerabend, Theses on Anarchism, 
[in:] I. Lakatos and P. Feyerabend, For and Against Method, edited and with an Introduction by 
M. Motterlini, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1999).
17 B. Barnes and B. Dolby, Scientific Ethos: a Deviant Viewpoint, European Journal of 
Sociology, vol. 11, 1970.
18 In a private letter to Lakatos, Feyerabend admits to receiving much more money publishing 
postmodern nonsense in popular magazines, than from well written philosophical articles published 
in scientific magazines (I. Lakatos and P. Feyerabend, For and Against Method).
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known forms of knowledge, in a mild and reasonable way. In other words, 
against harmful and idiosyncratic forms of specialization, we suggest a moderate 
form of polymathism — which should not be interpreted as the arrogance of 
knowing everything, but rather as the wise openness to everything.
Conclusions. In democratic countries there are specific social institutions in 
which knowledge can be treated as one social problem among others (e.g. 
governments, mass media). We do not think that academia is the right place to 
throw doubt upon the very raison d ’etre of knowledge. A philosopher who does 
not love knowledge appears to our eyes as a judge who dislikes justice, 
a physician who dislikes health, a priest who dislikes faith, an artist who dislikes 
beauty, a parliamentarian who dislikes democracy. If it is true that postmoder- 
nists do not love knowledge, then Bunge19 is right in defining postmodernism as 
a Trojan horse stabled in academia with the aim of destroying it.
It is, however, possible that postmodemists never had such bad intentions. We 
cannot exclude the possibility that they have been, on the contrary, inspired by 
philanthropic feelings: by imposing relativism they simply wanted to serve 
humanity, as this was supposed to be the philosophical ground on which 
a world of peace, pluralism, and tolerance could be built. Even so, they would 
have failed to understand that it is not the degree in which humans believe that 
produce tolerance or intolerance, but rather the naturę of the belief and the 
psychological profile of the believer. In certain cases, the stronger the belief, the 
higher the tolerance.
It is also possible that postmodemists are mere victims of yet another 
misunderstanding: they took too seriously the image of knowledge produced by 
positivists. Quite significantly, they adopted the worst version of the scientific 
method, the positivistic one, in order to discredit the scientific method. Similarly
— with a clearly ironie intent — we adopted the worst postmodern arguments in 
order to refute postmodernism. Indeed we do not believe ideas to be good or 
bad simply because they are new or old, but rather that they are more or less 
plausible or, in the best case, true or false.
Nonetheless, we hope that a post-postmodern era will indeed be ushered in 
shortly by our work and that of other young scholars and students. Our hope is 
that this era will represent the age of the re-birth, or renaissance, of knowledge
— not merely the practical knowledge praised by the positivists and attacked by 
the postmodemists, but that form of knowledge to which philosophy, science, 
religion, art, and myths — from their different but mutually enriching points of 
view — have always tried to tend: answers to the ultimate ąuestions of humans.
15 M. Bunge, The Sociology-Philosophy Connection, Transaction Publishers, New Brun­
swick—London 1999, p. 223.
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True, we do not know if such knowledge is attainable, but affirming the 
impossibility is as gratuitous as affirming a possibility. Thus, we prefer to engage 
in a joyful search for truth, justice, and beauty, rather than to despair in 
a horizon of nihilism. Nietzsche, the nihilist par excellence, said that man is just 
a falling drop of rain. We think that the human condition is not so sour, that is, 
if the drop can at least cultivate the hope of falling into the infinite ocean of truth.
Postmodernism is Old, Let Us Go Further: 
a pamphlet against deconstructionism, constructivism 
relatmsm and methodological anarchism
Summary
This paper means to be a collective and multicultural pamphlet against the postmodern 
approach to knowledge. The authors accept some postmodern ideas, but they also find it 
necessary to stress the many limits of this approach and its inability to respond to the 
challenges of the present day. From their perspective, postmodernism is not a new 
approach that has simply to be studied, but an old one that needs to be surpassed. They 
consider the problem of skepticism and methodological relatmsm to be one of the major 
weaknesses of the postmodern thought. Conseąuently, this paper-manifesto announces, 
in a ironical way, the arrival of the post-postmodern era. Authors hope this era will 
represent the age of the re-birth, or the renaissance, of knowledge — not merely the 
practical knowledge praised by the positivists and attacked by the postmodemists, but 
that form of knowledge to which philosophy, science, religion, art and myths, from their 
different but mutually enriching points of view, have always tended to: knowledge as an 
answer to the ultimate ąuestions of human beings.
